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The Priority of Human 
Interests 
Lawrence C: Becker 
My purpose here is to put forward an argument in defense of the moral 
priority, for humans, of human interests over comparable ones in ani- 
mals.' In outline the argument is certainly not original. But I am not 
aware of any previous attempt to work it out in detail. For that reason, 
and also because the subject matter itself is somewhat fuzzy, the argu- 
ment lacks the precision possible these days in discussions of utility func- 
tions, duties, rights, and obligations. But it is an important argument 
nonetheless---even if it turns out to be wrong-and its neglect has con- 
tributed a great deal to the suspicion that there is something fundamen- 
tally amiss in current discussions of the treatment of animals. 
In outline, the argument is simply this: There are certain traits of 
character that people ought to have-traits constitutive of moral excel- 
lence or virtue. Some of these traits order preferences by "social 
distance"-that is, give priority to the interests of those "closer" to us in 
social relationships over the interests of those farther away. Animals are 
typically "farther away" from us than human beings. Thus, to hold that 
people ought to have the traits constitutive of virtue is to hold, as a conse- 
quence, that people ought (typically) to give priority to the interests of 
members of their own species. 
That is the outline, and it will require a great deal of filling in to 
make it convincing. But I want to make it clear from the outset that no 
amount of filling in will turn this argument into a defense of the proposi- 
tion that humans are morally superior to animals (whatever that might 
mean). Nor will the argument deny consideration to the interests of ani- 
mals in the making of moral decisions, or deny that those interests can 
often ovemde human ones. My argument is not a defense of the cruelty to 
animals found in factory farming and much scientific experimentation. 
'I shall usually follow the convention of excluding humans from the class denoted by 
'animals. ' 
Lawrence C. Becker, "The Priority of Human Interests." In Ethics and 
Animals, edited by Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams, 225-42. 
New York: Humana, 1982.
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(But as far as I can tell, the argument is indeterminate with regard to using 
some sorts of animals for food and for some experiments.) 
Basically the argument presented here is about priorities in situations 
where animals' interests conflict with comparable human ones. It oper- 
ates most directly as a refutation of a line of reasoning sometimes put for- 
ward as decisive evidence of the irrationality of our treatment of 
animals-a clincher, so to speak, designed to show that preference for 
human interests is at bottom a prejudice (called speciesism) comparable 
to racism and sexism.l The line of reasoning to which I refer goes some- 
thing Lie this: 
Animals (at least the "higher" ones) have some of the same interests 
that humans have: avoiding pain, for example, and seeking pleasure. Fur- 
thennore, some human %ngs--such as infants and the severely 
retarded--have interests only in the sense that the higher mammals do: 
they lack the self-consciousness, complexity of purpose, memory, imagi- 
nation, reason, and anticipation characteristic of normal human adults. 
Yet we treat the animals very differently from the humans. It is customary 
to raise the animals for food, to subject them to lethal scientific experi- 
ments, to treat them as chattels, and so foah. What justifies such differen- 
tial treatment? It must be some morally relevant difference in the charac- 
teristics of humans and animals per se, or in their circumstances vis-a-vis 
the world at large, or in their rights and our duties to them, or in the con- 
sequences (for social welfare) of differential treatment. But in some cases 
it is plain that there is no such morally relevant difference between hu- 
mans and animals. Hence our preference for the interests of the humans in 
these cases is just a prejudice.' 
T h e  term 'speciesism' was coined by Richatd Ryder (1975, p. 16) and is used also by 
Peter Singer (1975). 'Humanism,' unfortunately, is already in use for other purposes. 
'Such reasoning is implicit in many classic and current writings on our treaunent of 
animals. For an exolicit use of it. see Sinzer, 1975, pp. 17-18, Put more fully, and more 
. . 
formally, the argument goes like this: - 
( I )  It is undeniable ihac many species other than our own have "interests"-at least in 
the minimal senw that thcv feel and vv to avotd Pam. and feel and seek vartous sons Of 
~~~ ~~ ~ 
pleasure and satisfaction. (Many also appear to be purposive in a stronger sense as well, 
but that is a more complex issue.) 
(2) It is eauallv undeniable that human infants and some of the profoundly retarded have . . . ,
tnterestb in only the sense that members of these other species hive then&nd not in the 
sense that normal adult humans have them. That n, human tnfantr and some af the pro- 
foundly relarded lack the normal human adult qualities of purposiveness, self- 
consciousness, memory, imagination and anticipation to the same extent that some other 
species of animals lack those qualities. 
(3) Thus, in terms of the morally relevad characteristic of having interests, some hu- 
mans must be equated with members of others species rather than with normal adult hu- 
m beinns. 
(4) ~ e ~ r e d o m r n e n t  moral judgments about conduct toward these humans are dramatic- 
ally d ~ f f e m t  from judgments about conduct toward the comparable anlmals It is cuslom- 
w w rat- the animals for food, to subject them to lethal scientific expenmentr. to veal 
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My contention is that this line of reasoning is incorrect-not because 
it fails to find some patent and morally relevant distinguishing character- 
istic that it ought to have found, but because it assumes that such a char- 
acteristic must be found in order to justify preferential treatment for hu- 
mans. On the contrary, I shall argue that some differences in treatment 
that favor our own species are justified because they are the product of 
moral virtue in human agents. 
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT VIRTUE 
1 begin with some assumptions about moral virtue. The assumptions are 
as uncontroversial as I can make them-which does not mean, of course, 
that I think they can always be used without analysis and justificatory ar- 
gument. But for present purposes they seem to be unpmblematic. 
The lirst is that moral virtue is, at bottom, a matter of character 
traits. It is defined by a complex of propensities and dispositions to feel, 
to imagine, to deliberate, to choose, and to act. Being a good person is 
not just acting on principle, or doing the right thing, for the right reasons, 
most of the time. To be a good person is to be someone for whom right 
conduct is "in character." The good person is, in part, one whose re- 
sponses, impulses, inclinations, and initiatives-prior to a reasoned as- 
sessment of the alternatives-are typically toward morally good feelings, 
deliberations, choices, and conduct. 
them as chattels. and so fonh. It is not customam-indeed it is abhorrent to most oeoole 
. '~ 
even to consider--the same practices for h u m a  infanfs and the retarded. 
(5) But absent a finding of some morally relevant ch&stic (other than havine, inter- 
ests) that distinguishes these humans and animals, we must conclude that the pred&inant 
moral judgments about them are inconsistent. To be consistent, and to that extent rational, 
we must either treat Ule humans the same way we now mat  the animals, or treat the ani- 
mals the same wav we now treat the humans. 
(6) And there d&s not seem to be a morally relevant characteristic that distinguishes all 
humans from all other animals. Scnticnce, radonality. personhood. and so fonh all fail. 
The relevant theoloeical doctrines are c o m t l v  ree&&d as unverifiable (at least in this 
. - ~~~ ~ 
life) and hence unacceptable as a basis for a philosophical morality. The assertion that the 
difference lies in the porential to develop interests analogous to those of normal adult hu- 
mans is also correctl; dismissed. ~ f l e r ~ l l .  it is easilv shown that some humanswhorn 
we nonetheless re& to treat as animals lack t ie  relevant potential. In short, the 
standard candidates for a morally relevant differenuating characteristic can be re~ected. 
(7) The conclusion is, therefdre, that we cannot give-a reasoned justification for the 
differences in ordinary conduct toward some humans as against some animals. 
(Funher arguments are then given to show that the change required of us is the 
upgrading of the treatment of some animals rather than the downgrading of the matment 
of comparable humans.) 
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The second assumption about moral virtue, or moral character, is 
that it sometimes produces spontaneous, uncalculated conduct. Utility 
theory itself requires that we develop habits of thought, expectations, 
rules of thumb, reflexive responses, and so on. The alternative is a ludi- 
crous fonn of paralysis that is self-defeating on rigorously act-utilitarian 
principles alone. I take it that the other standard types of moral theory 
come to the same conclusion: that the good person is one who sometimes 
acts without weighing the consequences, or canvassing peoples' rights 
and duties, or in any other way deliberating about what to do. Sometimes, 
as a necessary consequence of being morally virtuous, a good person just 
has, and acts on, uncalculated feelings, beliefs, expectations, and prefer- 
ences. 
The third assumption I make about moral excellence is that the char- 
acter traits that define it form a coherent system constrained both by wel- 
fare needs and by obligations. Coherence is assumed to avoid the prob- 
lems raised by conflicts among traits: Unconditional truth-telling may 
conflict with tact; but I am assuming that as these things enter into the 
dispositions that define virtue, a rough balance is struck that in principle 
pennits both tactful and truthful behavior. Constraints imposed by wel- 
fare needs and by obligations are assumed to avoid the problems raised by 
fanaticism. Loyalty may be an element of virtue, but not when it is blind 
to the consequences for welfare, or to the violation of rights and duties, or 
to the requirements of justice generally. 
The fourth assumption is that the ability to develop and sustain 
friendships is a necessary part of moral excellence. (I mean to restrict this 
assumption to situations in which people can meet their survival needs 
without extreme difficulty, and in which they are dealing with people of 
good will. Further, as I use the term friendship, it includes intimate and 
intense love relationships as well as those characterized by mutual re- 
spect, admiration, and affection.) 
Finally, I assume that the traits that define moral excellence produce 
"open" but stable and unambivalent feelings, beliefs, expectations, and 
preferences. The feelings, beliefs, and so on must be open to change in 
the sense that the moral person must be persuaahble. Fixed attitudes, as 
opposed to stable ones, are not part of moral excellence. But the person 
who lives in an agony of uncertainty about every act, every feeling, every 
preference, or who is thrown into confusion by every suggestion of error, 
does not exemplify moral excellence either. That is why the traits that 
make up moral character must be stable and the beliefs, attitudes, and so 
forth that the traits produce must be unambivalent. 
With these few assumptions about moral excellence in the back- 
ground, then, I want to argue for some favoritism toward members of our 
own species. 
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SOCIAL DISTANCE AND PREFERENCES 
When hard choices have to be made, I am ordinarily expected to rank the 
interests of my family above those of my friends, friends' above neigh- 
bors', neighbors' above acquaintances', acquaintances' above strangers', 
and so on. In general, the expected preference ordering follows typical 
differences in the intimacy, interdependency, and reciprocity in human 
relationships. Such differences are constitutive of what may be called 
"social distance"-an imprecise amalgam of relevant facts about tolera- 
ble spatial arrangements, the frequency and nature of permissible social 
"Qteractions, and roles in social structures.' 
There are exceptions to these expected preferences, of course, along 
several dimensions. One is obligations: I may have made agreements with 
strangers that override ordinary commitments to family. Another is pro- 1 
portionality: the uivial Interests of a friend do not outweigh the survival 1 
needs of an acquaintance, for example. And still another dimension of 1 
exceptions has to do with deviations from the typical pattern of relation- 
ships: if my familily has abused me and cast me out, whereas some 
friends have taken me in, I may be expected to reverse the usual prefer- 
ence order. (People sometimes explain this by saying: These friends are 
my real family.) 
In addition to the exceptions, there are the well-known conceptual 
problems raised by any such ordering of preferences. Who is my neigh- 
bor? Is it mostly a matter of geography or of social organization? Is a 
family a biological unit or a sociological one? Where are the lines be- 
tween friendship and mere acquaintance, and between acquaintance and 
lack of it? 
The concept of social distance is a slippery one. As it has been used in social psychol- 
ogy, it mostly has to do with tolerable levels of social "relatedness": Would you many a 
-? Would you accept a - as a close relative by marriage? As a mrmnate? As a 
neighbor? As a member of your club? The answers to such questions are thought to estab- 
lish a social distance scale--particularly with respect to race, nationality, social class, and 
religion. See Sherif, 1976, for an overview of fhis material. Her references to the work of 
H. C. and L. M. Triandis are especially wonh pursuing. The relation of spatial m g e -  
ments to social distance has also been explored. See the discussion and references in 
Shaver, 1977, pp. 108-1 1 1 .  But I have not been able to f i n k i t h e r  in texts or in primary 
sourccsa careful analysis of the concegt of social distance. And the emoirical work 90 
r~ ~~ ~ - - - -  -- far done in the m a  ha, ignored h e  f c a ~ r e  hat is of most concern to me here-namely, 
preferences in the distribution of icarcc goods. Would you glvc the last available food to 
-over -? is a son of questdon that has not becn asked tn hex studies. As a result 
~ ~ ----~. 
I shall have to proceed in tern of what seem to me to be plausible assumptions. ~ u l t u A  
anthropology seems to pmmise more, but it too (at least to the unvained eye) operates 
without a detailed analysis of h e  concept of social distance. See, for example, the inter- 
esting material in Bohaman and Bohaman, 1953, pp. &30 and Middletm, l%5, Ch. 4. 
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Finally, the operation of such preference ordering is constrained by 
principles of justice: Similar cases must still be treated similarly; deci- 
sions should be non-arbitrary; and in some highly regularized cases, we 
require that the decision process not be covert, or manipulative, or in- 
volve ex post facto legislation or self-interested adjudication. 
I do not mean to minimize the importance of all these matters. But I 
am concerned here with two other issues: the moral justification, if there 
is one, that can be given for any preference ordering by social distance; 
and the consequences of that for our treatment of animals. 
Utility, Rights, and Duties 
The act-utilitarian justification of preference ordering by social distance is 
notoriously weak. It depends upon the highly contestable empirical con- 
tention that aggregate welfare is best maximized when individuals use 
such orderings. This is obviously false in many cases where our firmest 
moral intuitions (as the saying goes) still insist on preference for those 
closest to us. And more to the point is the wide range of cases in which 
utility would require reversing or at least ignoring matters of social dis- 
tance. The interests of children who are statistically unlikely to lead so- 
cially productive lives would have to be subordinated to the interests of 
other children; the interests of the infirm, or the chronically unemployed, 
or the aged would likewise have to be subordinated. And as long as no 
countervailing disutility resulted, such subordination would have to occur 
in families and among friends as well as in public p o l i ~ y . ~  Such cases can 
easily be multiplied, and they are enough to cast doubt on any act- 
utilitarian justification for preference ordering by social distance. 
Deontological accounts fare little better. It is easy enough to show, 
of course, that people typically have more duties toward those close to 
them than toward those far away. For one thing, as social distan6e de- 
creases, the number of contacts-and hence duty-making agreements 
-between people increases. For another, the number of role relation- 
ships in which duties are constitutive parts (e.g., parent-child; 
teacher-student) varies inversely with social distance. But showing that 
the number of duties varies with social distance is not quite the same as 
showing that there is a comparable variance in preference ordering. De- 
ontological theorists typically insist, after all, that there are human rights 
(and "natural" duties to all) as well as "special" ones. And it is hard to 
'As Jan Narveson has pointed out to me, act utilitarians would immediately reply that 
such cases are far-fetched. Parents do normally love their children more than any friend. 
Friends put each others' interests ahead of acquaintances', and so on. Consequently. as 
long as people have such feelings. there will always be disutility in rejecting social dis- 
tance preference ordering~. But that is not enough to satisfy anti-utilitarians. They want 
some ground for deciding whether such preference orderings are good independently of 
whether people just happen to have them. 
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see, on the face of it, how a natural duty to protect human life, for exam- 
ple, by itself, would put any given human life ahead of any other. To hold 
that such preferences (say for family over friends) are built into the defini- 
tion of role-related duties is just to beg the question. What just$es build- 
ing them in? 
Further, we do not always want to describe social distance prefer- 
ences as matters of duty (or right). A preference for a hopelessly sick 
child over a healthy adult (e.g., in terms of distributing scarce food) may 
be something we approve of--even though we cannot give it a justifica- 
tion either in terms of duty or utility. 
Virtue and Social Distance 
What I want to explore is the notion that some traits of character that are 
constitutive of moral excellence entail social distance preferences. The 
traits I have in mind are reciprocity (i.e., the disposition to make a pro- 
portional return of good for good), and empathic identification with oth- 
ers. (There are no doubt other traits for which the same argument could be 
made. I do not propose my list as exhaustive.) 
RECIPROCITY. Reciprocity is a pervasive social phenomenon- 
and one that appears not only as a mere practice, but as a norm for con- 
duct in virtually every society of r e c ~ r d . ~  Returning good in proportion to 
good received-at least in many common social exchangesis pre- 
scribed, as well as predictable, human behavior.' It is evident, by infer- 
ence, that the disposition to reciprocate (leaving aside the issue of proper 
motives) is quite generally regarded as an element of moral virtue. 
Further, it seems clear that one can justify the inclusion of such a 
disposition in an account of moral virtue. It has obvious social utility that 
its absence or opposite would lack. It is, for example, necessary for sus- 
taining conviviality, friendships, and certain sorts of cooperative endeav- 
ors. For those reasons, and perhaps others, it is also plausible to think that 
rational contractors would choose a world in which people had such dis- 
positions over one that differed only in lacking them. Rights theory insists 
on the mutual respect, balanced exchanges. and so on that are characteris- 
tic of reciprocity. And reciprocity is obviously embedded in Aristotelian 
accounts of moral character. In short, if any traits of character can be 
given a reasoned justification as necessary pans of moral virtue, reciproc- 
ity is among them. 
EMPATHIC IDENTIFICATION. A similar case can be made for the 
ability and the propensity to see situations from other points of view, to 
understand and indeed to share others' experience empathetically. (I in- 
clude here also the ability to identify with characters in narrative art and 
'See, for example. Gouldner. 1960. 
The return of bad for bad is a much more complex matter. 
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to have vicarious experience through such identification.) Aside from its 
utility in settling conflicts, empathy is a prerequisite for applying the util- 
ity calculus. How else can we estimate utilities for others? 
I assume that other standard moral theories would also list empathy 
as an element of virtue. Rational contractors would most likely prefer a 
world in which agents had this trait to one in which they did not. Deonto- 
logical theory cannot work without the means for deciding what counts as 
a violation-an injury-to another. And that seems to require in moral 
agents the ability and propensity to understand the suffering of others. (I 
assume that right conduct, in deontological terms, is more than a mere 
mechanical performance of tasks--that it requires proper motives as 
well.) 
RELATION TO SOCIAL DISTANCE. It is easily seen, I think, that 
both the disposition to reciprocate and the disposition to empathize ordi- 
narily result in distributions ordered by social distance. Given limited re- 
sources with which to reciprocate, and limited energy, time, and imagina- 
tive ability for empathic identification, those closest to us will inevitably 
get a disproportionate share-both of the goods we distribute and the at- 
tention we pay to them. But do we prefer satisfying the interests of those 
closer to us? That is, supposing we have the dispositions to reciprocate 
and empathize, do we, as a consequence of that fact, order preferences 
(as well as actual distributions) by social distance? I think so, for the fol- 
lowing reasons. 
Take reciprocity first. 
(1) The smaller the social distance between people, the more intri- 
cate and pervasive are the exchanges between them. Consequently, the 
difficulty of deciding who is in debt to whom, or when equilibrium has 
been achieved in a relationship, varies inversely with the distance. Such 
calculations are virtually impossible within a nuclear family, and ex- 
tremely difficult even for close friends. In such relationships, it would 
nearly always be reasonable for everyone involved to feel either in debt or 
cheated no matter what choices were made-at least, that would be possi- 
ble if people tried to keep a strict accounting of who owed what to whom. 
The potential for continuous ill-feeling-and the consequent breakdown 
of close relationships--is obvious. With good reason, therefore, we do 
not cultivate "reciprocity accounting" at all in close relationships--as 
long as the relationships remain stable and roughly balanced. 
(2) This seems an eminently justifiable position to take with regard 
to moral excellence. If it is a part of moral excellence to be able to de- 
velop and sustain friendships, and if the parts of moral excellence must 
form a coherent whole (both of which I am assuming here), then the dis- 
position to reciprocate must be compatible with the ability to develop and 
sustain friendships. Thus the disposition to avoid strict accounting-at 
least in close relationships-is required. 
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(3) The required disposition changes as social distance increases, 
however, partly because the potential for reasonable disagreement over 
credits and debits decreases. Many exchanges with strangers are discrete 
and of assessable value. And many of the benefits we receive from stran- 
gers are so indirect that reciprocity for these can be equally indirect (e.g., 
by our being law-abiding, productive citizens). So the stability of rela- 
tively distant relationships is not threatened by a more calculative ap- 
proach. 
(4) Finally, we are, typically, always more "in debt" to family than 
to friends, to friends than to acquaintances-if for no other reason than 
the sheer frequency of exchanges. The more transactions there are in a 
relationship, the more likely it is that there will be "loose ends." When 
all of this is put together-the fact that the closer the relationship, the 
more likely we are to be "in debt," and the fact that the closer the rela- i tionship, the less exact is our knowledge of debts--it follows that it is 
always reasonable for virtuous people to think that anything they have to 
give is more likely "owed" to those closer than those farther away. Dis- ' 
tributional preferences, given the disposition to reciprocate, will therefore 
be ordered in terms of social distance. 
Something similar may be said of empathy. We identify most fully 
with those closest to us. That is, their interests are "real" to us in a way 
that the interests of more distant people are not. Empathic identification 
with the suffering (or pleasure) of people whose very existence we know 
about only indirectly (thmugh the descriptions of others) cannot help but 
have an imaginative, dilute, and dubitable quality. In contrast, the inter- 
ests of those close to us--the interests communicated to us directly-have 
a vividness, immediacy, and indubitability that imaginatively const~cted 
empathy can never match. It is certainly plausible to suppose that, insofar 
as empathic identification produces conduct "for" the interests of others, 
it will produce preferences for those with whom our empathy is strong 
over those with whom our empathy is weak. The consequence is prefer- 
ences ordered by social distance. 
SOCIAL DISTANCE ACROSS SPECIES LINES 
My argument so far has been that the virtuous perso-as a consequence 
of certain traits constitutive of virtue--orders preferences by social dis- 
tance. 1 want to argue now that, certain exceptions aside, the social dis- 
tance from us to members of other species is greater than to members of 
our own species. The consequence-for virtuous people--is a systematic 
preference for the interests of humans over the interests of other animals. 
The argument is fairly straightforward. 
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First Step 
Social distance decreases as the quantity and "immediacy" of social in- 
teraction increases. This is just definitional. When I interact directly with 
someone-without intermediaries-and when I do so frequently, the so- 
cial distance between us (other things being equal) is less than it would be 
if the interactions were indirect and infrequenL8 That is part of what is 
meant by "social distance." (I say "part" because there are other ways 
in which social distance can increase or decrease.) 
Second Step 
Dependence, when it is recognized as such by one or more of the parties, 
is a feature of relationships that typically reduces social distance-by 
increasing both the quantity and immediacy of interactions. The depend- 
ent one struggles to stay "close"; the one depended upon must continu- 
ally deal with the demands of the other---even if only by rejecting them. 
Thus, the more dependent a being is on another, the smaller the social 
distance between the two tends to be.' 
It is again definitional, at least when the notion of a "relationship" 
is suitably restricted. Social distance concerns interactions in which be- 
ings may be said to be acting toward, with, for, or against each other. It is 
only those sorts of interactions that I refer to as "relationships." Thus the 
causal relation (of interdependence) that we have with certain symbiotic 
microorganisms is not a relationship in this sense. (Or, put another way, 
it is one in which the social distance between the parties is infinite.) Simi- 
larly, our dependence on oxygen is not to he analyzed in terms of social 
distance, nor are the causal relations between ourselves and vegetables. 
But we cae have relationships in the requisite sense with many sorts of 
animals, and with virtually all human beings. In these relationships, our 
recognition of the truth about dependence is one of the factors that deter- 
mines social distance. And the more the dependence, the less the social 
distance. 
Third Step 
Animals are typically much less dependent on us, in our relationships 
with them, than are those humans (infants and so on) to whom the ani- 
mals are comparable (in terms of their interests, intelligence and so 
The "other things being equal" clause is ctucial here. After all. the interactions in 
hand-to-hand combat are direct and immediate. And though there is sometimes a bond 
- 
k1ucr.n snelnicb lhdt could c~nic ivab ly  bc described ~LI "closcncss." I l a  irlalbdn lo sucral 
d ~ u a n : ~  as I una u m g  the term is certainl) nm an ess! one to expl~cdtr 
Yt is W O R ~  mting &at affection betweenthe parties is not necessarily involved at all. 
Affection is one son of "closeness" in relationships, but not the only sort. See. for exam- 
ple, Hacker, 1951. 
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forth). Romulus and Remus aside, helpless humans are dependent on 
other humans for survival, health, and happiness to a degree that the com- 
parable animals are not. The social distance from human adults to human 
infants is thus typically smaller than the distance to comparable animals. 
Final Step 
Consequently, given the ordering of preferences by social distance en- 
tailed by moral excellence, we will typically prefer the humans. (I say 
"typically" because in special cases--such as pets, wounded or crippled 
animals, and those who suffer directly from human act ionsthe  same 
kind of dependence can exist.) 
A much richer account of the increases in social distance across spe- 
cies lines can probably be constructed from social-psychological 
findings-for example, about the propensity for and limitations of 
empathic identification. But such complications are not necessary to the 
argument already made. Similarly, it would be possible to enrich the ar- 
gument greatly by developing an account of the greater intricacy and po- 
tency of reciprocal relationships among normal adult humans compared 
to that between humans and animals. But that would take the argument 
well beyond its present purpose. 
VARIETIES OF SPECIESISM 
To review the argument so far, then, I have argued that certain elements 
of moral virtue order preferences by social distance, and that social dis- 
tance typically increases across species lines. The result is the conclusion 
that moral character disposes us to prefer the interests of humans to those 
of animals. But to what extent? Here it is worthwhile distinguishing some 
possible varieties of speciesism to see which son the argument supports. 
Categorizing types or degrees of speciesism is a somewhat arbitrary 
process. I am not prepared to say that the spectrum from weak to strong 
versions is continuous, hut neither are there indisputable "natural" 
breaks that justify a unique list of types. The four varieties distinguished 
below are thus offered more as illustrative of important differences than 
as definitive of fixed positions.'' 
Absolute Speciesism 
To hold that any human interest outweighs any (sum of) nonhuman inter- 
est(~) is to hold what I shall call the absolute version of speciesism. The 
reason for the label should be clear. This version refuses to rank any ani- 
"In an unpublished paper, Tom Regan has also argued for distinguishing several varie- 
ties of speciesism. I have profited fmm his discussion. 
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mal interest (no maner how serious) above any human interest (no matter 
how trivial). It also refuses to rank any sum of animal interests, no matter 
how large, above even one trivial human interest. An absolute speciesist 
would hold, for example, that it would be moral for a human being to 
cause the most extreme suffering imaginable to millions of animals in or- 
der to satisfy a whim (as long as doing so did not frustrate any comparable 
or greater human interest). 
As a perfectly general principle, this is a straw man. No one seri- 
ously defends it. No defensible moral theory could support it, and my 
argument in this paper is no exception. The very character traits that en- 
tail preference ordering by social distance also entail the subordination of 
some human interests to animal interests. After all, the dispositions to re- 
ciprocate and empathize do not operate only with respect to members of 
our own species. They operate in any "relationship3'-as that term was 
defined earlier. And the dispositions must order preferences by signifi- 
cance level1' as well as social distance-else empathy would lose its use- 
fulness in assessing priorities for conduct, and reciprocity (as a propor- 
tionate return of good for good) would be impossible. So the recognition 
of the need to reciprocate to animals, and the empathic identification with 
their interests as well as with those of humans, necessarily admits thepos- 
sibility of subordinating human interests. Absolute speciesism is ruled 
out. 
Resolute Speciesism 
The absolute position may be weakened in a number of ways. To hold, 
for example, that any significant human interest outweighs any (sum of) 
nonhuman interests, is to hold what I shall call the "resolute" version of 
speciesism. Here the number of animal interests is not important, for even 
one "significant" human interest will outweigh any number (no matter 
how large) of nonhuman interests. (It also follows that a trivial human 
interest outweighs any sum of trivial animal interests.) 
What counts as a significant interest is a central concern here, of 
course. But significance level is not. This resolute position asserts that 
any significant human interest outweighs any sum of nonhuman ones. 
Just as any number of animals may, on this view, be sacrificed for the 
survival of one human being, so too they may be sacrificed for health, or 
happiness, or psychological growth. 
"By a significant interest 1 mean, mughly. one whose satisfaction is necessary for bio- 
logical survival, physical health, physical security, physical comfort. pleasure (of a sort 
that comes fmm satisfying basic drives), and psychological growth, development, and 
health. It has been hypothesized (and partially confirmed in scciopsychological studies) 
that there is a rough hierarchy of significant interests common to all sentient beings we 
have studied. But finely drawn hierarchies-especially among interests that could be 
called trivial-are probably impossible. 
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I cannot find any support for such a position--either from the virtue 
argument advanced here or from standard moral theories. The disposi- 
tions to reciprocate and empathize must take account of significance 
level, as I noted earlier. And given that they operate in all of our relation- 
ships with other beings--and not just in our relationships with other 
humans--the idea that significant human interests can never be over- 
whelmed by significant animal interests is implausible. In fact animal in- 
terests do, often, outweigh nontrivial human ones for people we believe 
to be virtuous. If we have good reasons for accepting this (partial) ac- 
count of v i r tueand I think we dc+then we must accept the conse- 
quence that virtuous people will reject the "resolute" speciesist position. 
Weak Speciesism 
The situation is different when the speciesist position is weakened still 
further, however. The minimal position-what might be called "weak" 
speciesis-simply holds that when human and animal interests are 
equivalent (in terms of both significance level and number) the human 
interests are to prevail. Since this is the minimal version of speciesism, if 
my arguments support speciesism at all (which I think they do), they must 
support at least this version. 
I noted earlier, however, that there are exceptions-produced by the 
very traits of character that typically produce preferences for humans. Re- 
lationships between humans and animals often develop that reverse the 
typical preference ordering. (Just as friends can sometimes be closer than 
families.) But this is not indicative of an inconsistency in moral character, 
or of a problem that needs to be resolved. On the contrary, it is a perfectly 
consistent expression of the traits of reciprocity and empathy. 
What is a problem, and a serious one, is defining equivalence in sig- 
nificance levels---especially for cases in which the humans are self- 
conscious and purposive while the animals are not. Is a threat to a hu- 
man's "life" as used in the sentence "My life was over when I retired" 
equivalent to a threat to the biological existence of an animal that does not 
have such a "career"? That is, would a virtuous person necessarily re- 
gard it as such? I do not know. Are the pleasures of the table (for a human 
lifetime) equivalent to the lives of the animals used to supply pleasant 
eating? Until some answers can be given to such questions, it is hard to 
say just how much of a speciesist position is authorized by my arguments. 
Moderate to Strong Speciesism 
. 
Similarly for a whole range of positions-in between the weak and reso- 
lute versions of speciesism-which attempt to give rough weights to the 
number of interests involved. How many animals may be sacrificed for a 
human life? Ten? Ten thousand? Here the quest for precision seems ludi- 
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crous and offensive. And indeed it is unnecessary if we are prepared to 
accept, as morally right, whatever virtuous people generally agree is 
right." 
VIRTUE RATHER THAN PRINCIPLE 
And that is ultimately the recommendation I come to on this matter: that 
we should rely on the collective judgment of those among us who come 
closest to exemplifying (what we can defend as) moral excellence. 1 think 
that course commits us to some version of speciesism-not the absolute 
or resolute varieties, but conceivably something in the moderate to strong 
range. 
My reason for advocating this course is simple. The speciesist tend- 
encies 1 have described are consequences of (parts of) moral excellence. 
The fact that we can find no reason for speciesism when we consider the 
consequences, or the morally relevant characteristics of animals viv-a-vis 
some humans, is irrelevant. If we want people to be virtuous-not just to 
act on principle, but to have the traits characteristic of virtue-then we 
are going to get some version of speciesism in people's behavior. Since 
the problem of determining equivalent significance levels is so resistant to 
analysis (after all, the notorious problem of interpersonal comparisons of 
utility is just part of it), it seems reasonable to accept, as moral, whatever 
behavior follows from the traits that constitute moral excellence. One rea- 
son that we cannot be very sure where that will lead us (e.g., with regard 
to vegetarianism) is that we do not have modem analyses of virtue that are 
comparable in subtlety and detail to those we have for utility, duty, obli- 
gation, and rights. We need such analyses, and 1 hope that if the argument 
I have presented here does nothing else it makes that need more apparent. 
SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE ARGUMENT 
There are a number of important objections that can be raised against the 
argument I have given. I shall try to answer some of the most pressing 
ones, at least in enough detail to indicate how an adequate response could 
be developed. 
Preferences Do Not Justify Decisions13 
Objection: Even if virtue disposes me to order my preferences by social 
distance, it does not follow that it permits me to act out those preferences 
'?An instructive attempt to work out the grounds for accepting. as jusr, whatever deci- 
sions arc made by "aompelent moral judges" may be round in Rawls, 1951. Other rele- 
vant articles include Thomas, 1980: Wallace. 1974; and Becker, 1975. 
"This objection, and the one that follows it. were raised by lames Cargile in an excel- 
lent sct of comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
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to the disadvantage of people (or animals) who happen to be "farther 
away" from me than family or friends. If a judge, for example, or the 
captain of a sinking ship, or a physician forced to distribute scarce life- 
saving resources, is faced with putting the welfare of a friend before that 
of an equally needy and deserving stranger, we would (?) expect the 
judge (or captain, or physician), if virtuous, to prefer the friend but to act 
impartially. Virtue is complex in this respect, sometimes forcing us to act 
in ways that go against our sentiments and preferences. So the argument 
for speciesism (from virtue) is not sound. It may establish that it is virtu- 
ous to prefer the interests of humans, but it has failed to show that it is 
virtuous to act out those preferences. 
Reply: It is important to notice that the examples that make this ob- 
jection plausible are all drawn from "public" morality. They are cases in 
which people, in their roles as "officials" or professionals, are required 
to be impartial-to suppress their social distance preferences. Such im- 
partiality, when combined with an overriding concern for applying the 
calculus of utility, is what is typically called ruthlessness." 
Ruthlessness (or at least impartiality) may be a virtue in public life- 
that is, we may have good moral grounds for wanting officials and profes- 
sionals to develop such dispositions. (Even that is a dangerous doctrine.) 
But in private life it is surely implausible to think that impartial conduct, 
contrary to feelings and preferences, is virtuous. The criminal law makes 
explicit exceptions for the family members of the accu~ed'~; tort law 
imposes duties of care on family and friends that it does not impose on 
strangersI6; contract law applies different equitable standards depending 
on whether or not a transaction was at "arm's length." " And indeed, 
"friends" who never act out their friendship (i.e., preferences), or family 
members who never act out their special love for one another would fail 
to be what we mean by friends or family. In short, in private life at least, 
the dispositions to reciprocate and empathize-as parts of moral 
excellence-must produce not only preferences ordered by social dis- 
tance, but conduct based on those preferences. To prohibit such conduct 
is to prohibit one aspect of (private) virtue. 
lmpartiality 1s Compatible with Virtue 
Objection: Perhaps, though, impartial attitudes and conduct are compati- 
ble with private virtue in the way asceticism is thought (by some) to be. 
'?See Nagel. 1978. 
"I think here, for example, of the rules that give spouses immunity fmm having to 
testify against their maniage partners. 
'5ee the discussion of the duty to rescue in Prosser. 1971. P 56. 
"See, for example, the case of Jackson vs Seymour 71 S.E. 2nd 181 (1952) in which a 
man was penalized for making a large profit on a business deal wilh his sister-nder 
conditions that would not have raised an eyebrow if he had had no "special relationship" 
to the "victim." 
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That is, it might be saintly-the sort of "perfect" virtue that we cannot 
expect of ordinary folk, but by which we identify the very best among us. 
If so, then we cannot say that virtue per se entails preferences and conduct 
ordered by social distance, but only that imperfect or ordinary virtue does 
SO. 
Reply: My inclination is to reject this-to argue that saintliness (of 
the sort under discussion) is not perfect virtue at all, but rather an awe- 
inspiring amplification of one or a few of the elements of virtu-to the 
detriment of the others. Ascetics, like the perfectly impartial saint, seem 
to me to stand in relation to the morally virtuous much as body-builders 
stand to athletes. It is hard to deny flatly that body-builders are athletes. 
But there is some question about it, and they are certainly not candidates 
for athletic perfection. But even if it were true that perfect impartiality 
were the perfection of virtue, it would not follow that we either could ex- 
pect or would want that perfection in very many people. If not, then the 
argument I have given for the priority of human interests-at least for or- 
dinary peoplestands. 
Racism, Sexism, and Social Distance 
Objection: Is it not notorious that social-psychological studies of social 
distance invariably report that racism (and perhaps sexism) are in part de- 
fined by increases in social distance across racial (and perhaps sexual) 
lines? And do these studies not further report that racism and sexism so 
defined are pervasive in every society so far studied? If so, and if the facts 
about social distance warrant speciesism, then does the same line of rea- 
soning not support racism and sexism as well? 
Reply: The answer is no. The argument I have given is not based 
only on facts about social distance-as found in people's actual attitudes. 
If it were, the paper would have been very short indeed, for the facts 
about people's social distance attitudes toward animals are even more oh- 
vious and entrenched than their attitudes about race and gender differ- 
ences. The argument I have given is based instead on the logic of various 
elements of moral character-namely the dispositions to reciprocate and 
to empathize. These necessarily yield preferences ordered by social dis- 
tance that, when combined with some facts about actual differences be- 
tween humans and animals, result in preferences that can be called 
speciesist. But surely it is generally agreed that racism and sexism are not 
entailed by the logic of virtue in a similar way. Quite the contrary, they 
result from a lack of moral excellence in (among other things) precisely 
the traits under discussion here: they come in part fmm a culpable failure 
to reciprocate and to empathize across racial or sexual lines. The failure is 
culpable in the case of racism and sexism because it is based on false 
beliefs-negligently or willfully held-about the inappropriateness of 
reciprocating and the futility of trying to empathize. (Similar analyses ap- 
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ply to other forms of dispositional discrimination that we find 
objectionable-such as the favoritism shown young and attractive pa- 
tients in hospital emergency rooms.) 
The case is very different with animals, even though much of our 
cruelty to animals is based on a culpable failure to exercise our empathic 
powers. The argument here condemns such cruelty. But there are also 
differences-in the powers of normal adults and the dependency (on us) 
of the o thers that  entail greater reciprocity and empathy for members of 
our own species than for others. The consequent "failures" to reciprocate 
or empathize as fully with animals as with humans are therefore not cul- 
pable in the way that the failures of the racist or sexist are. In short, the 
argument here, if sound, justifies some degree of speciesism, but not rac- 
ism or sexism. 
Virtue versus Principle 
Objection: But does the whole argument not rest on simply defining ele- 
ments of virtue in such a way that they yield speciesism? For example, if 
we can find good reasons for thinking that animals have rights compara- 
ble to those possessed by human infants, then is it not irrelevant that the 
social distance to the humans is smaller and that we typically give priority 
to the human interests? Or put another way, if we were to decide that 
animals had such rights, would we not then have to redefine the traits of 
character constitutive of virtue so that they would not yield speciesism? 
After all, the disposition to be just, e.g., to respect rights and to treat sim- 
ilar cases similarly-is also presumably a part of virtue. If animals have 
rights similar to human ones, then any trait of character that encouraged 
us to ignore the equality could not be a part of virtu+because it would 
not be consistent with the disposition to be just. So what we would need 
(for virtue) would he dispositions to reciprocate and to empathize that 
subordinated themselves to the demands of justice. And that seems cor- 
rect in any case. Feelings of "closeness" should not control our conduct; 
principles should. And if our moral principles tell us that human interests 
should not be given priority over comparable animal interests (because 
there is no morally relevant difference between the two sons of interests), 
then that is how we should act-whether this ovenides our dispositions or 
not. 
Reply: This is an important objection, and somewhat more difficult 
to handle than the third one. The general form of an adequate reply seems 
to me to be the following: The disposition to be just is certainly a part of 
virtue. And if it turned out that some animals had rights equal to those of 
some humans--and there were no other relevant differenceethen the 
animals would fall under the similar cases rule. But that still leaves the 
question of how to decide conflicts. (After all, conflicts among humans 
who all have equal rights also have to be decided somehow.) The argu- 
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ment here would still support deciding the conflicts along species lines, 1 
think. 
The general point about the subordination of what our virtues incline 
us to do to what our moral principles tell us to do raises a much more 
fundamental and difficult issue. The only thing I can say about it here is, I 
am afraid, none too helpful. The conflict between virtue and principle is 
the stuff of which moral paradox and tragedy are made. We want people 
to develop traits of character that are stable and that yield immediate, 
wholehearted (unambivalent) conduct. Even if such traits are "open" to 
change, they cannot be both stable and at the same time sensitive to every 
small change in utilities; they cannot produce immediate unambivalent 
conduct and at the same time wait to feel the impact of applied moral 
reasoning. The occasional consequenceto take an extreme c a s ~ i s  a 
tragedy like Oedipus'. Oedipus had the traits that constituted excellence 
in a king (e.g., decisiveness, honor, the willingness to sacrifice self- 
interest, trust in those closest to him), and these traits brought him down. 
The result is tragic, even paradoxical, when it turns out that utility itself 
recommends the development of such traits. But I do not th~nk that there 
is any straightforward way of concluding that it is the traits that ought to 
be abandoned. 
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Comments on "The Priority of 
Human Interests" 
James Cargile 
There are, apparently, people who think that a dog's Life is as valuable as 
a human's, who would hold that if it is a choice between saving a human 
being or saving a dog but not both, there is no prima facie basis for 
preferring the human. One can even imagine someone extending this atti- 
tude to insects or plants. And there is no a priori reason to assume that 
such people are unlikely to be converted by argument. It is logically pos- 
sible that someone might be led reluctantly to such a position by the fal- 
lacy of affirming the consequent, and give it up with relief when his mis- 
take is pointed out. But on aposteriori grounds I am pessimistic about the 
prospects for discussions with such thinkers. 
Professor Becker argues that morally virtuous people will, and so 
people generally ought (typically), "to give priority to the interests of 
members of their own species." I strongly agree with this conclusion and 
I wholeheartedly endorse his suggestion that the concepts of virtue and 
excellence of character should not be neglected in favor of those such as 
utility, duty, obligation, and rights. Furthermore, I cannot confidently 
predict that having subtler and more detailed analyses of the concept of 
virtue is not going to help settle arguments over vegetarianism or other 
questions about animals. Who knows what wnsiderations will lead peo- 
ple, or to what views? However, at our present level of understanding 
virtue, 1 do not think Professor Becker's argument for giving priority to 
human interests is adequate. 
Professor Becker argues that morally virtuous people cannot recipro- 
cate and empathize as well with animals as with people, which leads to 
there "typically" being what he calls a greater "social distance" be- 
tween people and animals than between people. One objection he consid- 
ers is that some people also are a greater social distance from blacks or 
women, so that his argument for discriminating against animals could 
also be used to justify discriminating against blacks or women. His reply 
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